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Abstract 
The forecast of tax revenues is based on several methodologies. The literature review of empirical studies 
has concluded that the main ones are; the effective tax rate approach, the marginal tax rate approach, the 
elasticity approach, the regression approach and the analysis of co-integration. These approaches are 
advocated by International institutions, especially the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in its 
technical assistance of developing countries and its trainings to officials. Thereby, this paper aims to 
examine these different approaches, to apply them on Moroccan data and to compare their results in 
order to improve the forecasting system of Moroccan tax revenues. It turns out that the forecast of 
government revenue is a tough task that relies on the perfect knowledge of the predictable variables 
context and the awareness of the various external factors that can influence the future achievements. 
Moreover, regular comparisons of the forecasts and the revenue recorded are found to be fundamental to 
assess the quality of the estimates in order to increase the accuracy of predictions. 
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1. Introduction 
In many developing countries, tax revenues forecasting remains an important issue. Several researchers 
concluded that a persisting under or over-prediction of tax revenues in government budgets is a problem 
that emerged in both developed and developing countries. Indeed, high forecast errors can result from 
institutional vulnerability, inefficient tax administration and technical errors.  
In fact, setting up a precise tax revenue forecast is a challenging task that requires taking into account a 
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wide set of macroeconomic variables, tax structure and the conducted fiscal policy. The IMF addresses 
these questions in its paper IMF (2013) (Note 1) by presenting four approaches that improve tax revenue 
forecasting in developing countries.  
This paper review the four approaches used by the IMF; the effective tax rate approach, the marginal tax 
rate approach, the elasticity approach and the regression approach, and uses finely co-integration 
procedures to find long term relationship between taxes and their tax base for the Moroccan case.  
 
2. Literature Review 
Forecasting future tax revenues is very important to conduct macroeconomic regulation efficiently. In 
this chapter, we conduct a brief review of literature about optimal tax policy, based on the work of 
Ramsey (1927) and Mirrlees (1971), and on a tax revenues analysis.  
2.1 The Theory of Optimal Taxation 
The literature on optimal taxation suggests that a tax system should be chosen to maximize a social 
welfare function subject to a set of constraints (Note 2). The social welfare function is a nonlinear 
function of individual utilities. Nonlinearity allows, for example, to consider a social planner who prefers 
more equal distributions of utility. However, an approach taken up by Werning (2007) (Note 3) addresses 
a more restricted schema presuming that the social planner is only concerned about average utility. This 
statement implies that a social welfare function is linear in individual utilities. To simplify the problem 
facing the social planner, it is often assumed that the economy is populated by identical individuals, 
having the same preferences over consumption and leisure.  
The next step in setting up a tax system is to specify the constraints of the function. Ramsey (1927) (Note 
4), in his very early contribution, suggested that the planner must raise tax revenues through taxes on 
commodities only. However, we cannot rule out income from various sources by assumption.  
If the social planner is at liberty in choosing a tax system, the optimal tax would be simply a “lump-sum 
tax”, which is a tax that have a fixed amount, no matter the change in circumstance of the taxed entity. 
Then again, the rich and the poor are taxed equally, placing a higher burden on the latter.  
As the model still fails to deliver useful and realistic prescriptions, a second wave of optimal tax models, 
lunched by James Mirrlees (1971) (Note 5), enables the planner to deal with unobserved heterogeneity 
among taxpayers. The basic version of the model considers that individuals are different depending on 
their ability to earn income.  
Thereby, Mirrlees approach formalizes the balance between equality and efficiency that governments 
should keep. In fact, even though the planner would like to target high-ability taxpayers he needs to make 
sure the tax system provides sufficient incentive the group with higher taxes to keep producing at the high 
levels. The Mirrlees framework allows the planner to consider all conceivable tax systems, but makes the 
optimal tax problem much complex. Since the Mirrlees contribution, much progress has been made using 
this approach, especially in Kaplow (2008) (Note 6). 
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2.2 Evaluation of Tax Policy Revenues  
A country’s tax system reflects its response to the evolution of social, economic, and political influences. 
Therefore, the form of a tax system, has wide economic, political, and social implications.  
A well-designed tax regime should encourage competitive growth across various sectors of the economy, 
in order to stimulate higher economic growth. This can be achieved by expanding savings and leading 
investment to high return activities. However, the tax should create neither major distortions in 
consumption and production behavior nor change private investment decisions, it has to be neutral. 
Moreover, a tax system should be transparent so that it is easy to administer and simple for the taxpayers 
to comprehend and comply with. The simpler and the more transparent a tax system, the lower its 
administration and compliance costs.  
Besides, taxes are supposed to be sufficient in order to finance the expenditure needs of the government 
over time. In fact, revenues should rise with national income, and the entire tax system should evolve to 
enhance the revenue yield over time. Therefore, tax revenues should increase at a rate equal to or greater 
than the growth of the GDP. To ensure this, the government should adopt tax policies that include 
growing sectors of the economy in the tax base. 
The stability of tax revenues over time is equally important in order to maintain the continuity of the 
fiscal policies of the government. If the tax revenue tends to fluctuate over time, it becomes a source of 
risk and imposes another element of economic inefficiency on the country that adversely affects 
government programs. 
For any tax system to be able to provide stable revenues to its government, it is desirable that the tax 
revenue can respond automatically to increases in the national income which result from economic 
growth. The pace of such an increase in revenue would depend on the revenue elasticity of the tax system 
(Note 7).  
The evaluation of the relationship between revenue and national income gives the government a valuable 
insight into the overall tax system. This understanding assists the government in planning for tax reforms 
to drive inclusive growth.  
As a rule, the total of government tax revenues is determined by the size of the tax base, the levels of tax 
rates adopted within the tax system, administrative efficiency, and the compliance rate. Revenue 
estimates are undertaken with respect to the level of the expected GDP growth rate, the rate of inflation, 
and other macroeconomic variables.  
The preparation of tax revenues forecasts is done according to selected methodologies -approaches used 
by International Institutes and VECM- and common assumptions of a tax system. These assumptions are 
made for certain macroeconomic variables, such as growth of the national income and the inflation. 
  
3. International Institutes Methodologies 
Tax analysis and tax revenue forecast are crucial in ensuring adequacy and stability in tax policies. 
However, forecasting government revenues is a challenging task that requires taking into account a wide 
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set of macroeconomic variables, tax structure and the conducted fiscal policy. The IMF addresses these 
questions in its paper IMF (2013) (Note 8) by presenting four approaches; the effective tax rate approach, 
the marginal tax rate approach, the elasticity approach the regression approach. 
3.1 Effective Tax Rate Approach 
The effective tax rate (ETR) represents the amount of revenues actually collected as a percentage of the 
tax base. Using the ETR in revenue forecasting allows taking into account certain factors, such as tax 
exemptions and tax evasion. 
We can postulate that a relationship exists between the tax base and the tax revenue if the ETR is stable 
over time. Once ETR stability is confirmed, we can use it to forecast revenues by multiplying the tax base 
by the tax rate. 
However, the forecast is constrained by the difficulty of determining the tax base, forasmuch that we 
need a large amount of very detailed information to assess the evolution of different tax bases. Especially 
since these data are not always available or published. And even if it is possible to determine the tax base 
for several years, it is not always possible to forecast it. 
For these reasons, IMF (2013) uses a tax base substitution in order to analyze the behavior of tax 
revenues and forecast future revenues. This tax base is an economic variable that is closely related to the 
actual tax base and for which data are available. The following table lists the categories of taxes and the 
tax bases suggested by the IMF. 
 
Table 1. Suggested Proxy Tax Bases for Tax Revenues 
Taxes Suggested proxy taxes base 
Tax on net income 
and profits 
Corporate The profits derived from the national accounts or nominal GDP 
Individual Wages or nominal GDP 
Taxes on goods and services Private consumption at current prices or nominal GDP 
Excise duties Private consumption at current prices or nominal GDP 
Import duties Value and volume of imports in local currency 
Source: IMF (2013). 
 
Thus, to forecast tax revenues, we first calculate the ETR, which is defined as the amount of taxes recipes 
divided by the proxy tax base: 
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 =
𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑦 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒 
 
The forecast of tax revenue (Tax) using the ETR and forecasts of the tax base (Taxbase) is achieved using 
the following formula: 
𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑡 = 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑡 ∗ (𝐸𝑇𝑅)/100 
Once we conclude that the ETR is stable, we can forecast tax recipes by multiplying the estimated tax 
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base by the tax rate. If the effective tax rate is not stable, it may be substituted by the marginal tax rate. 
3.2 Marginal Tax Rate Approach 
The marginal tax rate (MTR) is expressed by the ratio of the change in tax revenues to the change in the 
tax base: 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 =
∆ 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒
∆𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑦 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑒 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 
 
The forecast of tax revenue (Tax) using the marginal tax rate (MTR) and the change in forecast of the tax 
base (Taxbase) is based on the following formula: 
∆𝑇𝑎𝑥 = 𝑀𝑇𝑅 ∗ ∆𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 
If the MTR is stable, we estimate the future evolution of revenues by multiplying the forecast of the tax 
base by the MTR. It is important to note that the change in income tax is divided into two parts: one 
corresponding to a change in the tax base and its impact on income and the other corresponding to a 
change in the tax system (in the tax rate, the tax structure, coverage of tax, etc.). 
3.3 Elasticity Approach 
The tax elasticity is defined as the ratio of the percentage change in tax revenue to the percentage 
change in the tax base, assuming that the tax system remains unchanged during the period. Considering 
the GDP as a variable of the tax base, the elasticity with respect to GDP is written as follows: 
𝐸𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 =
∆𝑇 𝑇⁄
∆𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝐺𝐷𝑃⁄
 
Where T indicates tax revenues issued from an unchanged tax system, meaning that actual tax revenues 
excludes the estimated impact of changes in the tax system during the analyzed period. The IMF 
recommends an estimation of elasticity using “rough averaging” of the ratio over a period witch there 
was no regime change. 
Once we estimate the elasticity of the tax and we forecast the growth rate of the tax base, we can 
predict tax revenues by multiplying the growth rate of the tax base by the elasticity applying the 
following formula: 
𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑡 = 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑡−1 ∗ (1 + 𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 ∗ ∆%𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑡) 100⁄  
3.4 Regression Approach  
The IMF uses Regression analysis to estimate the quantitative effect of tax base variables on tax 
revenues. The accuracy of this method depends on the existence of a relationship between the 
explanatory variables, say GDP (the proxy tax base), and the total tax revenues.  
𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐼𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑡−1+𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐼𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 
Thereby, tax revenue forecasting is made using the estimated regression coefficients, the GDP forecast 
and tax revenues of the previous year. However, estimates using the Ordinary Least Square Method 
(OLS) are only meaningful if the variables involved are stationary. If not, OLS estimation will generate 
fallacious regressions. 
Since the nominal revenue and GDP series are often non-stationary variables, a more appropriate 
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alternative to the OLS method is to use co-integration procedures to find a long-term relationship 
between revenue and GDP. The existence of a co-integration relationship implies that the linear 
combination of the log of taxes and the log of GDP is stationary. 
 
4. Vector Error Correction Model (Johansen’s Approach)  
Johansen’s approach is a method for estimating more than one co-integration relationship between 
variables on the long-term using the maximum likelihood test.  
In the following, we present the main steps of the co-integration approach. Thus, we estimate error 
correction models and study the long-term relationships between revenues (total tax revenue, VAT, 
Corporate Taxes (IS) and Income Taxes (IR)), the real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the 
Consumer Prices Index (CPI). Johansen’s methodology takes its starting point in the VAR (Vector Auto 
Regressive) of reduced rank (the number of co-integration relationships). The steps generally followed 
are: 
 Determination of lag length in the VAR representation. 
 Co-integration test and determining long-term relationships. 
 Estimation of the vector error correction model (VECM). 
 Model validation. 
4.1 Models Estimation  
Before determining models linking tax revenues to real GDP and the CPI over the period 1990-2016, 
one must begin by testing the stationary and the order of integration of the series. Thus, we examine 
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) (Note 9) test results, using E-Views software, in order to determine 
the stationarity properties of the variables. The results of the ADF test as reported in the table below 
shows that all series are stationary integrated of order one, except the CPI which is found to be 
stationary in its level: 
 
Table 2. ADF Test Results  
Time series 
Model used 
for the test 
ADF test 
critical value 
at the 5% 
Order of Integration 
ADF Statistics 
Total Tax revenues (rec) 
with trend 
with constant 
 
-4.212116 -3.580623 Stationary I (1) 
VAT -4.402664 -3.603202 Stationary I (1) 
IS -4.402585 -3.603202 Stationary I (1) 
IR -5.245292 -3.603202 Stationary I (1) 
GDP -7.471209 -3.587527 Stationary I (1) 
CPI -4.212116 -3.580623 Stationary I (0) 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
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Step 1: Lag length selection 
This first step is to determine the order of the VAR representation. The calculation of the information 
criteria LR (Note 10) FPE (Note 11) AIC (Note 12) SC (Note 13) and HQ (Note 14) for the four models 
indicates that the optimal number of lags is 1 or 2 (Appendix 2). Taking into account the small sample 
size, we opted for one lag that allows us to find better results and to obtain models with signs consistent 
with theory. 
Step 2: Johansen co-integration tests 
The trace test and the maximum eigenvalue established for the four models reveals the existence of at 
least one co-integration relationship (the tables in Appendix 3 summarizes the results obtained). 
The presence of co-integration between variables suggests a long-term relationship among the variables 
under consideration. Then, the VEC models, with one lag, can be applied on total tax revenue, VAT, IR 
and IS for one co-integrating vector. All series are transformed into logarithms, which can be useful in 
verifying the characteristics of partial short-term and long-term elasticities of the models.  
Our basic models would be: 
 Total Tax revenues: 𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑐 = 𝐹(𝑙𝑝𝑖𝑏, 𝑙𝑖𝑝𝑐) 
 VAT: 𝑙𝑡𝑣𝑎 = 𝐹(𝑙𝑝𝑖𝑏, 𝑙𝑖𝑝𝑐) 
 Corporate taxes: 𝑙𝑖𝑠 = 𝐹(𝑙𝑝𝑖𝑏, 𝑙𝑖𝑝𝑐) 
 Income taxes: 𝑙𝑖𝑟 = 𝐹(𝑙𝑝𝑖𝑏, 𝑙𝑖𝑝𝑐) 
with:  
Pib = GDP, 𝑙𝑝𝑖𝑏 = 𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑝𝑖𝑏) ,   𝑙𝑖𝑝𝑐 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑖𝑝𝑐), 𝑙𝑟𝑒𝑐 = 𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑟𝑒𝑐),   𝑙𝑡𝑣𝑎 = 𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑡𝑣𝑎),   𝑙𝑖𝑟 =
𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑖𝑟), 𝑙𝑖𝑠 = 𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑖𝑠) 
Step 3: Estimation results 
The estimation results of the four models are consistent with the theory. The estimated coefficients of 
the long-term relationship are globally significant with intuitive signs. In addition, the term 
error-correction is negative and significantly different from zero for all models (see Appendix 4, which 
contains the four VECM and their coefficients). 
Step 4: Models validation 
For model validation, the usual verifications were carried out; 
 Regarding the normality of residuals and autocorrelation test residues, we opted for Jarque-Bera 
and LM tests (Lagrange-Multipliar). According to E-Views outputs of these tests, we cannot reject the 
null hypothesis of normality or that of non-autocorrelation of residuals at a significance level of 5% for 
the four models (see Appendix 5 and 6). 
 For the stability of the models, the inverse roots of the polynomial characteristic of the four 
models are well within the unit circle. These results confirm the correct model specification (see 
Appendix 7). 
 The co-integration relations of the equilibrium models are stationary (see Appendix 8). This 
confirms the existence of a stable long-term relationship between the revenues, the GDP and the CPI. 
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4.2 Results Interpretation 
The estimation of Vector Error Correction Models for tax recipes provides an error-correction term 
coefficient is significant, meaning that the GDP and the CPI have long run influence on government tax 
revenues. This coefficient is equal to -0.47 for total tax revenues, -0.31 for VAT, -0.54 for corporate tax, 
and -0.63 for income tax. These results confirm the stationarity of the co-integrating vectors of 
estimated models. 
There by the speed of adjustment towards long run equilibrium indicate that total tax revenues adjust at 
a rate of 49% to their equilibrium levels after any shock from exogenous variables. For VAT, the IS and 
IR, they are adjusting at a speed of 31%, 54% and 63% respectively, compared to their equilibrium 
levels. 
These coefficients also indicate that the shock is completely absorbed at the end of aft two years (Note 
15, Note 16) for total tax revenues and corporate tax, 3 years (Note 17) for VAT and one year and half 
(Note 18) for income tax. 
The results of the regression analysis indicate the value of the coefficient of determination R2, which is 
equal to 0.40 for total tax revenues, indicating that 40% of the fluctuations of this revenue is explained 
by the model variables. This coefficient is equal to 0.30 for the VAT, 0.34 for corporate tax and 0.46 for 
the income tax recipes. We conclude that the models are a good fit and that the explanatory power and 
the overall significance of the model is strong enough to conduct a forecast. 
4.3 Forecasting Tax Revenues 
After estimating and validating the VECM models of government revenues, we proceed by forecasting 
total tax revenues, VAT, corporate tax and income recipes for the years 2017 and 2018, using real GDP 
and CPI forecasts. 
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Figure 1. Results of Tax Revenue Forecasting 
Source: author’s estimates. 
 
5. Analysis of Forecasting Results of the Different Approaches 
The table below presents revenue forecasts results for 2017 and 2018.  
 
Table 3. Revenue Forecasts Results 
 
2017 2018 
 
ETR MTR Elasticity VECM Average ETR MTR Elasticity VECM Average 
Rec (Note 19) 223714 227297 212 489 224 922 220 375 234350 241295 212 592 237257 228 066 
IS 47530 47396 45196 45542 46089 49789 51291 49029 47907 48908 
IR 40724 42474 42,159 40484 41122 42,660 46051 45555 42,398 43538 
VAT 79827 83,808 80806 79808 80,147 83,622 91 336 85577 83,971 84,390 
Source: author’s estimates. 
 
The steps of tax revenue forecasts are; evaluation of tax elasticity, evaluation of changes in economic 
conditions, and evaluation of the effect of inflation and price changes. 
When calculating the MTR we noticed that this rate is not stable during the period, which means we 
cannot use it to predict futures tax revenues. Moreover, we note that the forecast provided by the MTR 
approach have the highest values. 
The revenues forecasts can be obtained through the average of the results of the three methods, ETR, 
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Elasticity and VECM, in order to have more accurate forcasts. This average can be improved by taking 
into account future adjustments and tax measures.  
Ultimately, regular comparisons of the forecasts and the revenue recorded are fundamental to assess the 
quality of the estimates. Furthermore, the effectiveness of tax revenues forecast is based on the 
judgment and expertise of those who make them. The knowledge of the context of the variables allows 
for adjustments to quantitative results based on various external factors that can influence the future 
achievements.  
 
6. Conclusion 
This analysis begun with a brief review of literature about optimal tax policy, based on the foundational 
work of Ramsey (1927) and Mirrlees (1971). We can put forward the general lessons suggested by 
optimal tax theory as it has been presented in the work of Glenn P. (2000) (Note 7):  
 Optimal marginal tax rate programs depend on society’s ability distribution; 
 the optimal tax system would feature declining marginal tax rates; 
 the optimal tax schedule, with a universal lump-sum transfer, is found to be close to be optimal;  
 The optimal extent of redistribution rises with wage inequality;  
 In stochastic, dynamic economies, optimal tax policy requires increased sophistication. 
Afterwards, this study forecast Moroccan tax revenues using the approaches that are recommended by 
the IMF for developing countries and expend this analysis by applying a co-integration approach to 
overcome stationarity problems. 
The results of the different approaches are based on past observations taking into account the expected 
impact of the macroeconomic situation approached by the real GDP and the CPI. The accuracy of the 
forecast is a difficult goal that depends largely on the knowledge and the expertise of the economist 
who conduct the analysis.  
These approaches can be used to assess the quality of tax revenues prediction in order to gradually 
reduce forecast errors. The development of such approaches is necessary to support the draft of Finance 
Low with detailed economic analysis. Thereby, it is necessary to instore a database of financial, 
economic and social data containing the most detailed and documented information in order to meet the 
growing requirements for forecasts and studies of impacts of fiscal policy. 
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Note 11. FFO Final prediction error. 
Note 12. AIC: Akaike information criterion. 
Note 13. SC: Schwarz information criterion. 
Note 14. HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion. 
Note 15. 1 / 0.47 = 2.13. 
Note 16. 1 / 0.54 = 1.85. 
Note 17. 1 / 0.31 = 3.23. 
Note 18. 1 / 0.63 = 1.59. 
Note 19. Total tax Revenues. 
 
Appendix 
Appendix 1. Augmented Dickey Fuller 
tax revenues I (1) VAT I (1) 
 
Null Hypothesis: D (REC): has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on CIS maxlag = 6) 
   
Does 
Statistic 
Prob. * 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test 
statistic 
-4.514723 0.0074 
Test critical values: 1% level -4.374307 
 5% level -3.603202 
 10% level -3.238054 
 
 
Null Hypothesis: D (VAT): has a unit root 
Exogenous: Constant Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on CIS maxlag = 6) 
   
Does 
Statistic 
Prob. * 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test 
statistic 
-4.402664 0.0094 
Test critical values: 1% level -4.374307 
 5% level -3.603202 
 10% level -3.238054 
* MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values. 
IS I (1) IR I (1) 
 
Null Hypothesis: D (IS): has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on CIS maxlag = 6) 
   
Does 
Statistic 
Prob. * 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test 
statistic 
-4.402585 0.0094 
Test critical values: 1% level -4.374307  
 5% level -3.603202  
 10% level -3.238054  
* MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values. 
 
Null Hypothesis: D (IR): has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on CIS maxlag = 6) 
   
Does 
Statistic 
Prob. * 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test 
statistic 
-5.245292 0.0014 
Test critical values: 1% level -4.374307  
 5% level -3.603202  
 10% level -3.238054  
* MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values. 
Real GDP I (1) IPC I (0) 
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Null Hypothesis: D (GDP): has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 3 (Automatic - based on CIS maxlag = 6) 
   
Does 
Statistic 
Prob. * 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test 
statistic 
-3.302803 0.0097 
Test critical values: 1% level -4.394309  
 5% level -3.012199  
 10% level -3.003079  
* MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values. 
 
Null Hypothesis: CPI: has a unit root  
Exogenous: Constant Linear Trend  
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic - based on CIS maxlag = 6) 
   
Does 
Statistic 
Prob. * 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test 
statistic 
-4.212116 0.0129 
Test critical values: 1% level -4.323979  
 5% level -3.580623  
 10% level -3.225334  
* MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values. 
 
Appendix 2. Lag Length Criteria 
Tax revenues 
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 27.18710507595956 NA 2.90e-05 -1.934968 -1.788703 -1.894401 
1 166.4677280051047 233.9914* 8.70e-10* -12.35742* -11.77236* -12.19515* 
2 174.9113838108442 12.15886 9.44e-10 -12.31291 -11.28906 -12.02894 
* indicates lag order selected by the criterion. 
 
VAT 
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 17.19142201477803 NA 6.45e-05 -1.135314 -0.989049 -1.094746 
1 162.1862084445787 243.5912* 1.23e-09 -12.01490 -11.42984* -11.85263 
2 173.340429203331 16.06208 1.07e-09* -12.18723* -11.16338 -11.90326* 
* indicates lag order selected by the criterion. 
 
IS 
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 -4.711037 NA 0.000372 0.616883 0.763148 0.657451 
1 145.9174 253.0558* 4.50e-09 -10.71339 -10.12833* -10.55112* 
2 155.6913 14.07446 4.39e-09* -10.77531* -9.751451 -10.49133 
* indicates lag order selected by the criterion. 
 
IR 
* indicates lag order selected by the criterion. 
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 24.41134526315707 NA 3.62e-05 -1.712908 -1.566643 -1.672340 
1 156.4871829618125 221.8874* 1.93e-09* -11.55897* -10.97391* -11.39670* 
2 163.9024762312982 10.67802 2.28e-09 -11.43220 -10.40834 -11.14822 
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Appendix 3. Trace Test  
Tax revenues 
Selected (0.05 level *) Number of 
Cointegrating Relations by Model 
    
Data Trend: None None Linear Linear Quadratic 
test Type No Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept 
 No Trend No Trend No Trend Trend Trend 
Trace 1 1 1 2 3 
Max-Eig 1 1 1 2 3 
* Critical values are based MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999). 
 
VAT 
Selected (0.05 level *) Number of 
Cointegrating Relations by Model     
Data Trend: None None Linear Linear Quadratic 
test Type No Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept 
 No Trend No Trend No Trend Trend Trend 
Trace 1 1 1 1 2 
Max-Eig 1 1 1 1 2 
* Critical values are based MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999). 
 
IS 
Selected (0.05 level *) Number of 
Cointegrating Relations by Model     
Data Trend: None None Linear Linear Quadratic 
test Type No Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept 
 No Trend No Trend No Trend Trend Trend 
Trace 2 1 3 2 3 
Max-Eig 1 1 1 2 3 
* Critical values are based MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999). 
 
IR 
Selected (0.05 level *) Number of 
Cointegrating Relations by Model     
Data Trend: None None Linear Linear Quadratic 
test Type No Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept 
 No Trend No Trend No Trend Trend Trend 
Trace 3 3 2 2 2 
Max-Eig 3 3 2 2 2 
* Critical values are based MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999). 
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Appendix 4. VECM Models  
VAT 
Cointegrating Eq: CointEq1   
DLOG (VAT (-1)) 1.000000   
DLOG (PIBRE (-1)) -9.990071   
 (1.40404)   
 [-7.11521]   
LOG (CPI (-1)) 0.246933   
 (0.12057)   
 [2.04812]   
C -0.823564   
Error correction: D (DLOG (VAT)) D (DLOG (PIBRE)) D (LOG (IPC)) 
CointEq1 -0.307568 0.299991 -0.045097 
 (0.23575) (0.05704) (0.03248) 
 [-1.30465] [5.25947] [-1.38850] 
D (DLOG (VAT (-1))) -0.267026 -0.150714 0.021775 
 (0.23583) (0.05706) (0.03249) 
 [-1.13227] [-2.64137] [0.67018] 
D (DLOG (PIBRE (-1))) -1.305637 0.616742 -0.186970 
 (1.03276) (0.24987) (0.14228) 
 [-1.26422] [2.46823] [-1.31407] 
D (LOG (CPI (-1))) -2.268848 -0.004236 0.173461 
 (2.27996) (0.55163) (0.31411) 
 [-0.99512] [-0.00768] [0.55223] 
C 0.218079 -0.004027 0.045352 
 (0.17187) (0.04158) (0.02368) 
 [1.26883] [-0.09683] [1.91527] 
DUMREC -0.173443 0.027625 -0.032467 
 (0.15077) (0.03648) (0.02077) 
 [-1.15038] [0.75729] [-1.56303] 
DUM1 -0.029117 -0.026295 0.000268 
 (0.04871) (0.01178) (0.00671) 
 [-0.59782] [-2.23135] [0.03995] 
R-squared 0.325291 0.912338 0.435464 
Adj. R-squared 0.087159 0.881399 0.236216 
Sum sq. resids 0.158909 0.009302 0.003016 
SE equation 0.096683 0.023392 0.013320 
F-statistic 1.366009 29.48789 2.185539 
log likelihood 26.15519 60.21216 73.72719 
Akaike AIC -1.596266 -4.434347 -5.560599 
Schwarz SC -1.252667 -4.090748 -5.217000 
Mean dependent -0.003653 0.001390 0.021201 
SD dependent 0.101193 0.067924 0.015241 
Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.) 5.95E-10  
Determinant resid covariance 2.12E-10  
www.scholink.org/ojs/index.php/jepf          Journal of Economics and Public Finance                     Vol. 4, No. 4, 2018 
319 
Published by SCHOLINK INC. 
log likelihood 165.1502  
Akaike information criterion -11.76251  
Schwarz criterion -10.58446  
 
Tax revenues 
Cointegrating Eq: CointEq1   
DLOG (REC (-1)) 1.000000   
DLOG (PIBRE (-1)) -5.973431   
 (0.79855)   
 [-7.48032]   
LOG (CPI (-1)) 0.163795   
 (0.09523)   
 [1.71992]   
C -0.581574   
Error correction: D (DLOG (REC)) D (DLOG (PIBRE)) D (LOG (IPC)) 
CointEq1 -0.470064 0.338007 -0.013878 
 (0.21609) (0.08731) (0.04055) 
 [-2.17531] [3.87141] [-0.34222] 
D (DLOG (REC (-1))) -0.285235 -0.197960 0.021375 
 (0.19124) (0.07727) (0.03589) 
 [-1.49150] [-2.56199] [0.59555] 
D (DLOG (PIBRE (-1))) -1.435134 0.208651 -0.068355 
 (0.67781) (0.27386) (0.12721) 
 [-2.11732] [0.76189] [-0.53735] 
D (LOG (CPI (-1))) -1.045720 -0.381911 0.542057 
 (1.08726) (0.43929) (0.20405) 
 [-0.96179] [-0.86938] [2.65648] 
C 0.062115 0.005267 0.009057 
 (0.04387) (0.01773) (0.00823) 
 [1.41582] [0.29715] [1.10004] 
DUMREC2 -0.066862 0.006966 -0.000388 
 (0.03926) (0.01586) (0.00737) 
 [-1.70319] [0.43921] [-0.05268] 
R-squared 0.400243 0.849146 0.353558 
Adj. R-squared 0.233643 0.807243 0.173990 
Sum sq. resids 0.098060 0.016008 0.003454 
SE equation 0.073809 0.029822 0.013852 
F-statistic 2.402428 20.26421 1.968943 
log likelihood 31.94826 53.69827 72.10143 
Akaike AIC -2.162355 -3.974856 -5.508452 
Schwarz SC -1.867842 -3.680342 -5.213939 
Mean dependent -0.004229 0.001390 0.021201 
SD dependent 0.084313 0.067924 0.015241 
Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.) 4.74E-10  
Determinant resid covariance 2.00E-10  
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log likelihood 165.8255  
Akaike information criterion -12.06879  
Schwarz criterion -11.03800  
 
IS 
Cointegrating Eq: CointEq1   
DLOG (IS (-1)) 1.000000   
DLOG (PIBRE (-1)) -11.43442   
 (1.94964)   
 [-5.86489]   
LOG (CPI (-1)) 0.421270   
 (0.22710)   
 [1.85500]   
C -1.575479   
Error correction: D (DLOG (IS)) D (DLOG (PIBRE)) D (LOG (IPC)) 
CointEq1 -0.543853 0.129122 -0.012724 
 (0.32890) (0.04638) (0.02012) 
 [-1.65354] [2.78377] [-0.63242] 
D (DLOG (IS (-1))) -0.367894 -0.119135 0.006936 
 (0.22551) (0.03180) (0.01380) 
 [-1.63136] [-3.74601] [0.50279] 
D (DLOG (PIBRE (-1))) -2.690319 -0.011117 -0.108697 
 (1.95130) (0.27518) (0.11937) 
 [-1.37873] [-0.04040] [-0.91061] 
D (LOG (CPI (-1))) 0.933261 0.061611 0.560647 
 (2.75666) (0.38876) (0.16863) 
 [0.33855] [0.15848] [3.32463] 
C -0.045001 -0.004241 0.006871 
 (0.08160) (0.01151) (0.00499) 
 [-0.55152] [-0.36853] [1.37658] 
DUMIS3 0.044600 0.015416 0.007074 
 (0.12467) (0.01758) (0.00763) 
 [0.35774] [0.87680] [0.92759] 
R-squared 0.342948 0.844144 0.417552 
Adj. R-squared 0.160434 0.800851 0.255761 
Sum sq. resids 0.831576 0.016539 0.003112 
SE equation 0.214939 0.030312 0.013149 
F-statistic 1.879021 19.49823 2.580806 
log likelihood 6.295314 53.30678 73.35235 
Akaike AIC -0.024609 -3.942232 -5.612696 
Schwarz SC 0.269904 -3.647718 -5.318182 
Mean dependent -0.008489 0.001390 0.021201 
SD dependent 0.234578 0.067924 0.015241 
Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.) 3.27E-09  
Determinant resid covariance 1.38E-09  
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log likelihood 142.6729  
Akaike information criterion -10.13941  
Schwarz criterion -9.108615  
 
IR 
Cointegrating Eq: CointEq1   
DLOG (IR (-1)) 1.000000   
DLOG (PIBRE (-1)) 6.947405   
 (0.59426)   
 [11.6908]   
LOG (CPI (-1)) 0.076166   
 (0.07677)   
 [0.99207]   
C -0.687085   
Error correction: D (DLOG (IR)) D (DLOG (PIBRE)) D (LOG (IPC)) 
CointEq1 -0.632810 -0.341030 0.039454 
 (0.23796) (0.04745) (0.01757) 
 [-2.65932] [-7.18779] [2.24542] 
D (DLOG (IR (-1))) -0.081923 0.173914 -0.010924 
 (0.20548) (0.04097) (0.01517) 
 [-0.39869] [4.24491] [-0.72000] 
D (DLOG (PIBRE (-1))) 1.992393 0.259147 -0.111262 
 (0.82481) (0.16445) (0.06090) 
 [2.41559] [1.57580] [-1.82684] 
D (LOG (CPI (-1))) -3.522107 1.396372 -0.500246 
 (2.76733) (0.55176) (0.20434) 
 [-1.27275] [2.53074] [-2.44811] 
C 0.142005 -0.053314 0.083902 
 (0.17077) (0.03405) (0.01261) 
 [0.83158] [-1.56584] [6.65392] 
DUM -0.015035 0.067823 -0.057897 
 (0.12958) (0.02584) (0.00957) 
 [-0.11603] [2.62511] [-6.05095] 
DUMIR -0.078343 -0.043650 -0.004667 
 (0.05897) (0.01176) (0.00435) 
 [-1.32861] [-3.71266] [-1.07196] 
R-squared 0.460405 0.926227 0.799044 
Adj. R-squared 0.269959 0.900190 0.728118 
Sum sq. resids 0.196918 0.007828 0.001074 
SE equation 0.107626 0.021459 0.007947 
F-statistic 2.417516 35.57293 11.26591 
log likelihood 23.58175 62.28212 86.12218 
Akaike AIC -1.381813 -4.606843 -6.593515 
Schwarz SC -1.038214 -4.263244 -6.249916 
Mean dependent -0.007343 0.001390 0.021201 
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SD dependent 0.125963 0.067924 0.015241 
Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.) 1.63E-10  
Determinant resid covariance 5.78E-11  
log likelihood 180.7243  
Akaike information criterion -13.06036  
Schwarz criterion -11.88231  
 
Appendix 5. Normality Test for the Four Models 
Tax revenues VAT 
 
Component Jarque-Bera df Prob. 
1 10.33517 2 0.0057 
2 0.260379 2 0.8779 
3 1.740852 2 0.4188 
joint 12.33640 6 0.0549 
 
 
Component Jarque-Bera df Prob. 
1 5.423351 2 0.0664 
2 1.184614 2 0.5531 
3 2.728125 2 0.2556 
joint 9.336090 6 0.1555 
 
IS  IR 
 
Component Jarque-Bera df Prob. 
1 0.298577 2 0.8613 
2 1.033972 2 0.5963 
3 1.623734 2 0.4440 
joint 2.956283 6 0.8143 
 
 
Component Jarque-Bera df Prob. 
1 1.094420 2 0.5786 
2 0.238981 2 0.8874 
3 0.253417 2 0.8810 
joint 1.586818 6 0.9535 
 
 
Appendix 6. Residuals Autocorrelation Test for the Four Models 
Tax revenues VAT 
 
VEC Residual Serial Correlation LM Tests 
Null Hypothesis: no serial correlation at lag order pm 
Date: 09/08/17 Time: 12:26 
Sample: 1990 2016  
Included observations: 24 
lags LM-Stat prob 
1 13.85933 0.1274 
2 7.993951 0.5348 
Probs from chi-square with 9 df. 
 
lags LM-Stat prob 
1 16.70569 0.0535 
2 5.785537 0.7612 
Probs from chi-square with 9 df. 
IS  IR 
 
lags LM-Stat prob 
1 17.39272 0.0429 
2 5.949008 0.7450 
Probs from chi-square with 9 df. 
 
For the SI, the residue was corrélogrames asimulé to 
confirm idependance view that the LM test P-value is less 
than 5%. 
 
lags LM-Stat prob 
1 6.443088 0.6949 
2 8.736137 0.4620 
Probs from chi-square with 9 df. 
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Appendix 7. ECM Stability Test 
Tax revenues VAT 
  
IS  IR 
  
 
Appendix 8. Equilibrium Co-Integration Relationships 
Tax revenues VAT 
  
IS  IR 
  
 
